Robert Brandom interpreter of Hegel: some considerations on normativity and truth

Abstract

This article reflects on the pragmatic-semantic positioning of the United States philosopher Robert Brandom (1950), especially in that which concerns the reading of the work of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) under a pragmatic perspective. The influence of the German philosopher unveils itself when Brandom, in his conceptualization of normativity, makes reference to social practices, demonstrating that his interpretation of Hegelian theory considers that the semantic content of expressions is decided in the practice of social communication, that is, in the implicit recognition of norms reverberated in communicative practices. This writing addresses how Brandom approximates the inferential references of declarations by the normative behavior of the interlocutors, in other words, where in Hegel there is the return to the foundation of the thing, in Brandom an external relation is based, emptying the ontological dimension, fundamental in Hegelian articulation. From such a perspective, the article argues that Brandom’s philosophical proposal becomes irreconcilable, to a certain extent, with the theoretical undertaking of Hegel. This article concludes by acknowledging the positive aspects of Brandom’s interpretation of Hegel but calls attention to its contradiction when considering Hegelian logic as an investigation of existential relations.