Brentano’s theory of consciousness in the Psychology from an empirical standpoint and the problem of unconscious phenomena
Keywords:
Consciousness. Presentation. Unconscious phenomena.Abstract
The article addresses the theory of consciousness proposed by Brentano in his Psychology. After an exposition about the concept of intentionality and the types of intentional phenomena, his view on the structure of mental phenomena – constituted by (a) presentations and (b) objects – is discussed. After that, the structure of conscious phenomena, which, according to Brentano, ensures that all mental phenomena are conscious is discussed as well. However, it is questionable that his arguments are successful, since he himself concedes that the existence of presentations of objects not accompanied by corresponding (secondary) presentations is conceivable. Moreover, his objections to the arguments for the existence of unconscious phenomena (the argument of unconscious causes, the argument of unconscious effects and the argument of the functional relation) turn out to be weak.
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