Theories of truth and theories of meaning: a discussion of semantic skepticism and its possible solutions based on Quine, Davidson, and Dummett's work

Resumo

Quine's semantic skepticism asserts that two or more hypotheses about the meaning of p that are equally consistent with behavioral facts do not guarantee the same theoretical paradigm of p's meaning. Thus, a theory of truth for p is insufficient to entail a theory of meaning for p. Davidson contends that, while Quine is correct regarding the underdeterminacy of a theory of meaning by evidence, this does not rule out a theory of meaning. A theory of truth – consistent with Tarski's Tconvention – implies a theory of meaning. Dummett, however, thinks that a theory of truth fails to frame non-straightforward stipulations governing the role of sentences in cases involving nonclassical standards of proof. "Truth" is insufficient to be used as an idealized parameter to exhaust conceivable patterns for semantic theories. Quine highlights the weakness of a truth theory grounded in set theory and observation for generating stable theories of meaning. Davidson downplays the significance of this weakness and avoids reaching a semantic-skeptical conclusion, as he believes semantics need only be as robust as the theory of truth. Dummett contends that, while this weakness is a serious threat, it has no bearing on the objective parameters for a theory of meaning, because meaning is intended to function in roles truth standards cannot: defining the theoretical limits of a theory of assertion-judgment. These three authors are examined in this article to determine the scope of semantic skepticism and the possible responses to it.