Beyond the polis: phronesis and kairos in the parable of the Good Samaritan

Abstract

This article interprets the parable of the Good Samaritan (Lk 10:25–37) in light of Aristotle’s virtue ethics, with emphasis on the notion of phronēsis (prudence). Through a hermeneutical approach and conceptual analysis, prudence is examined as a category capable of illuminating the ethical structure of the Lukan narrative, articulating practical deliberation, otherness, and responsibility toward human vulnerability. It is argued that the figure of the Samaritan expresses a situated practical rationality, in which moral decision does not result from the application of abstract universal principles, but from the discernment of the singular circumstances of action. In the dialogue between Aristotelian philosophy and biblical exegesis, the parable is understood as a narrative expression of prudence in act, in which perception, affect, and action are inseparably articulated. Structural convergences and conceptual tensions are identified between Aristotelian rationality and Lukan theology, especially regarding the expansion of ethical responsibility beyond the limits of communal reciprocity. The study highlights the contemporary relevance of virtue ethics in light of the limitations of norm-based ethical models grounded strictly in rules.